. MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS: A STUDY IN SMALL UNIT LEADERSHIP AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOR. Journal of Military Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 363-364. doi: 10.1080/15027570.2012.758409.

Professor Weil’s thesis seems largely correct with respect to the United States, whose law on religious establishment I regularly teach. Funding is central to American debates over religious establishment. The fight over religious establishments in Virginia, which inspired both James Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments” and Thomas Jefferson’s “An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,” was over whether persons could be forced to pay taxes to support religious instruction. Financial concerns were at the root of church-state debates in the (...) nineteenth century, when Protestants repeatedly rebuffed Catholics who wanted funding for Catholic private schools. Many state constitutions still have what are known as mini-Blaine Amendments that forbid public funding for religious institutions. Whether proponents of a strong separation between church and state in the United States are fighting the same battles as proponents of a strong separation of church and state in France is nevertheless problematic. The French revolutionaries had to subordinate a reactionary church. The American revolutionaries merely had to negotiate peace treaties among the different sects that supported the Declaration of Independence. Separation of church and state in the United States is best conceptualized as a division of labor among liberal institutions rather than a means for purging anti-liberal religion from the liberal public sphere. (shrink)

The basic bimodal systemK/K can be interpreted as an analysis of the logic of ability developed in [1]. Where in [1] we would express the claimI can bring it about that P using the formula, with its non-normal operator, we will now use the formula. Here is a normal alethic possibilitation operator.is a normal necessitation operator, but it is independent of, and not subject to an alethic interpretation. Rather, is interpreted to meanI bring it about that P. The result is (...) a simplification and clarification of a combined logic of ability and action like that in [2], but employing only normal operators.A number of extensions of the basic systemK/K are constructed, first by strengthening the two normal sublogics independently and then by linking the two sublogics via axiom schemata involving both operators. The result is a series of increasingly strong systems which more and more adequately fulfill our expectations for a satisfactory logic of action and ability. (shrink)

Ligation is a form of chemical self-assembly that involves dynamic formation of strong covalent bonds in the presence of weak associative forces. We study an extremely simple form of ligation by means of a dissipative particle dynamics (DPD) model extended to include the dynamic making and breaking of strong bonds, which we term dynamically bonding dissipative particle dynamics (DDPD). Then we use a chemical genetic algorithm (CGA) to optimize the model’s parameters to achieve a limited form of ligation (...) of trimers—a proof of principle for the evolutionary design of self-assembling chemical systems. (shrink)

Many employers faced with rising health care costs have adopted “voluntary” wellness programs that urge employees to engage in various health-promotion activities, such as smoking cessation and weight reduction. In the proper setting, measures to promote a more healthful lifestyle are difficult to question, but there is little compelling evidence that workplace wellness programs have significant, sustained health benefits or substantially reduce health care costs other than through cost-shifting to unhealthy employees. Congressional support for workplace wellness programs has persisted on (...) a bipartisan basis for the last twenty years, and the incentives that current statutes allow employers to offer employees have become strong enough that the voluntariness of the programs has been called into question. In recent months, the battleground has shifted to the courts, where federal regulations and employer practices have been challenged. Three recent or pending cases raise questions about whether the incentives are coercing employees into the programs. (shrink)

This paper affirms the thesis that Kierkegaard can be properly and profitably read in light of the virtue tradition, broadly construed. I consider several objections to this thesis, including the idea that Kierkegaard largely opposes the culture of antiquity out of which the virtue tradition comes, that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on duty and the commanded nature of love is incompatible with genuine concerns of virtue ethics, and that Kierkegaard’s concept of faith is incompatible with a strong concern for the virtues. (...) Then I offer two avenues for broadening our thinking about his ethical philosophy in light of the attention he pays to the virtues. First, I argue that we may beneficially read Kierkegaard alongside Jane Austen, as someone whose writings reflect both the Christian and Aristotelian traditions. Second, in terms of contemporary moral philosophy, I suggest that Kierkegaard be placed in conversation with “radical virtue ethics,” a category recently introduced by David Solomon. (shrink)

Functional human brain mapping is commonly performed during invasive monitoring with intracranial electroencephalographic electrodes prior to resective surgery for drug­ resistant epilepsy. The current gold standard, electrocortical stimulation mapping, is time ­consuming, sometimes elicits pain, and often induces after discharges or seizures. Moreover, there is a risk of overestimating eloquent areas due to propagation of the effects of stimulation to a broader network of language cortex. Passive iEEG spatial-temporal functional mapping has recently emerged as a potential alternative to ESM. However, (...) investigators have observed less correspondence between STFM and ESM maps of language than between their maps of motor function. We hypothesized that incongruities between ESM and STFM of language function may arise due to propagation of the effects of ESM to cortical areas having strong effective connectivity with the site of stimulation. We evaluated five patients who underwent invasive monitoring for seizure localization, whose language areas were identified using ESM. All patients performed a battery of language tasks during passive iEEG recordings. To estimate the effective connectivity of stimulation sites with a broader network of task-activated cortical sites, we measured cortico-cortical evoked potentials elicited across all recording sites by single-pulse electrical stimulation at sites where ESM was performed at other times. With the combination of high gamma power as well as CCEPs results, we trained a logistic regression model to predict ESM results at individual electrode pairs. The average accuracy of the classifier using both STFM and CCEPs results combined was 87.7%, significantly higher than the one using STFM alone, indicating that the correspondence between STFM and ESM results is greater when effective connectivity between ESM stimulation sites and task-activated sites is taken into consideration. These findings, though based on a small number of subjects to date, provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that incongruities between ESM and STFM may arise in part from propagation of stimulation effects to a broader network of cortical language sites activated by language tasks, and suggest that more studies, with larger numbers of patients, are needed to understand the utility of both mapping techniques in clinical practice. (shrink)

Extending previous research on the characteristics associated with adolescents’ general tendency to be a moral rebel, the present study examined the roles of moral identity and moral courage characteristics on 3 expressions of the tendency to stand up for one’s beliefs and values despite social pressure not to do so. Results revealed that general and situation-specific moral courage characteristics are important motivators of individuals’ caring, just, and brave expressions of the tendency to be a moral rebel, especially when they possess (...) a relatively strong moral identity. (shrink)

Group decisions raise a number of substantial philosophical and methodological issues. We focus on the goal of the group decision exercise itself. We ask: What should be counted as a good group decision-making result? The right decision might not be accessible to, or please, any of the group members. Conversely, a popular decision can fail to be the correct decision. In this paper we discuss what it means for a decision to be "right" and what components are required in a (...) decision process to produce happy decision-makers. Importantly, we discuss how "right" decisions can produce happy decision-makers, or rather, the conditions under which happy decision-makers and right decisions coincide. In a large range of contexts, we argue for the adoption of formal consensus models to assist in the group decision-making process. In particular, we advocate the formal consensus convergence model of Lehrer and Wagner (1981), because a strong case can be made as to why the underlying algorithm produces a result that should make each of the experts in a group happy. Arguably, this model facilitates true consensus, where the group choice is effectively each person's individual choice. We analyse Lehrer and Wagner's algorithm for reaching consensus on group probabilities/utilities in the context of complex decision-making for conservation biology. While many conservation decisions are driven by a search for objective utility/probability distributions (regarding extinction risks of species and the like), other components of conservation management primarily concern the interests of stakeholders. We conclude with cautionary notes on mandating consensus in decision scenarios for which no fact of the matter exists. For such decision settings alternative types of social choice methods are more appropriate. (shrink)

We outline two points of criticism. Firstly, we argue that robots do constitute a separate category of beings in people's minds rather than being mere depictions of non-robotic characters. Secondly, we find that (semi-)automatic processes underpinning communicative interaction play a greater role in shaping robot-directed speech than Clark and Fischer's theory of social robots as depictions indicate.

Many opponents of BIG programs believe that receiving guaranteed subsistence income would act as a strong disincentive to work. In contrast, various areas of empirical research in psychology suggest that a BIG would not lead to meaningful reductions in work. To test these competing predictions, a comprehensive review of BIG outcome studies reporting data on adult labor responses was conducted. The results indicate that 93 % of reported outcomes support the prediction of no meaningful work reductions when the criterion (...) for support is set at less than a 5 % decrease in either average hours worked per week or the rate of labor participation. Overall, these results indicate that adult labor responses would show no substantial impact following a BIG intervention. (shrink)

Political metaphors do more than punch up messages; they can systematically bias observers’ attitudes toward the issue at hand. What, then, is an effective strategy for counteracting a metaphor’s influence? One could ignore or criticize the metaphor, emphasizing strong counterarguments directly pertaining to the target issue. Yet if observers rely on it to understand a complicated issue, they may be reluctant to abandon it. In this case, a “metaphor extension” strategy may be effective: Encourage observers to retain the metaphor (...) but reinterpret its meaning by considering other, less obvious implications. The current studies support this claim. Under conditions where participants gained a strong epistemic benefit from a rhetorical metaphor, they were more persuaded by a rebuttal that extended that metaphor. The studies use converging operational definitions of epistemic benefit and offer insight into how political attitudes are made and unmade. (shrink)

The general idea of strong foundationalism is that knowledge has a foundation in well warranted beliefs which do not derive any warrant from other beliefs and that all our other beliefs depend on these foundational ones for their warrant. Although inerrancy posits Scripture as a solid foundation for theology, the idea that the doctrine of biblical inerrancy involves a strong foundationalist epistemology is deeply problematic. In fact, inerrancy does not require any particular view of the structure of knowledge, (...) and notable sources on inerrancy tout it in ways inconsistent with most forms of strong foundationalism. (shrink)

Husserl repeatedly has claimed that (1) mathematics without a philosophical foundation is not a science but a mere technique; (2) philosophical considerations may lead to the rejection of parts of mathematical practice; but (3) they cannot lead to mathematical innovations. My thesis is that Husserl's third claim is wrong, by his own standards.

In America, White and affluent middle-school students outperform minority students and those of low socioeconomic status on measures of academic performance. This achievement gap is partly attributable to differences in academic engagement. A promising strategy for engaging students is to elicit an academic possible identity: an image of oneself in the future as an accomplished student. Tests of this strategy’s efficacy show mixed results, however. According to Identity-Based Motivation Theory, this is because a salient possible identity enhances goal engagement when (...) it is perceived to be strongly connected to one’s current identity. Still, the connection between temporally remote identities is an abstract concept that students may have difficulty grasping. According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this connection may be easier to conceptualize metaphorically in terms of a dissimilar concrete experience – in particular, a physical journey between locations. Integrating these theories, prior studies show that priming a journey-metaphoric framing of an academic possible identity increased academic engagement among college students. The current study tested whether this prime would similarly motivate middle-school students in an economically disadvantaged school setting. Results show that students framing their academic possible identity as a destination on a physical path, versus without a provided metaphor, reported higher academic engagement. This finding extends metaphor priming effects to low-income and minority adolescents, a crucial population in educational research, and points to low-cost, theoretically grounded interventions for boosting academic engagement. (shrink)

For vocal animals, recognizing species-specific vocalizations is important for survival and social interactions. In humans, a voice region has been identified that is sensitive to human voices and vocalizations. As this region also strongly responds to speech, it is unclear whether it is tightly associated with linguistic processing and is thus unique to humans. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging of macaque monkeys (Old World primates, Macaca mulatta) we discovered a high-level auditory region that prefers species-specific vocalizations over other vocalizations and (...) sounds. This region not only showed sensitivity to the ‘voice’ of the species, but also to the vocal identify of conspecific individuals. The monkey voice region is located on the superior-temporal plane and belongs to an anterior auditory ‘what’ pathway. These results establish functional relationships with the human voice region and support the notion that, for different primate species, the anterior temporal regions of the brain are adapted for.. (shrink)

Considerable work during the past two decades has focused on modeling the structure of semantic memory, although the performance of these models in complex and unconstrained semantic tasks remains relatively understudied. We introduce a two‐player cooperative word game, Connector (based on the boardgame Codenames), and investigate whether similarity metrics derived from two large databases of human free association norms, the University of South Florida norms and the Small World of Words norms, and two distributional semantic models based on large language (...) corpora (word2vec and GloVe) predict performance in this game. Participant dyads were presented with 20‐item word boards with word pairs of varying relatedness. The speaker received a word pair from the board (e.g., exam‐algebra) and generated a one‐word semantic clue (e.g., math), which was used by the guesser to identify the word pair on the board across three attempts. Response times to generate the clue, as well as accuracy and latencies for the guessed word pair, were strongly predicted by the cosine similarity between word pairs and clues in random walk‐based associative models, and to a lesser degree by the distributional models, suggesting that conceptual representations activated during free association were better able to capture search and retrieval processes in the game. Further, the speaker adjusted subsequent clues based on the first attempt by the guesser, who in turn benefited from the adjustment in clues, suggesting a cooperative influence in the game that was effectively captured by both associative and distributional models. These results indicate that both associative and distributional models can capture relatively unconstrained search processes in a cooperative game setting, and Connector is particularly suited to examine communication and semantic search processes. (shrink)

We find that if all countries adopt the necessary uniform global carbon tax and then return the revenues to their citizens on an equal per capita basis, it will be possible to meet a 2 °C target while also increasing wellbeing, reducing inequality and alleviating poverty. These results indicate that it is possible for a society to implement strong climate action without compromising goals for equity and development.

In this article, we use a corporate social responsibility (CSR) framework to analyze the payday loan industry by critically examining its practices from an economic, legal, and ethical perspective. Payday loans are essentially a very high cost, unsecured, short‐term personal loan. Given the inherent nature of the product being offered, the industry appears on the face of it to be in a position to potentially exploit vulnerable consumers in pursuit of profits. With this concern in mind, our analysis investigates the (...) following three issues: Can the payday loan industry currently be considered to be acting in a socially responsible manner? If the industry cannot be considered to be socially responsible, should it be further regulated? If the industry should be further regulated, how should it be regulated? To address these issues, we first provide a brief historical overview of payday loans. Second, we describe the important characteristics of payday loans and how the industry operates. Third, we draw on various sources of evidence to demonstrate that the payday loan industry, while fulfilling its basic economic obligations, falls outside of both the legal and ethical domains of the Three Domain Model of CSR. Based on our analysis, our conclusion is that the payday loan industry requires additional government legal regulation, particularly with respect to allowable fees, and we conclude that there is a strong ethical case for banning payday loans altogether. (shrink)

Registrants for the academic study of philosophy, expecting an encounter with special cognitive products, regal truths, are soon enough disabused. Philosophy, its supposedly special access to the structure of things exploded, is relegated to sundry tasks of intellectual hygiene. I track down the source of the unrealistic view, anatomising what has a strong claim to be regarded as the regal enterprise’s inau¬gural reasoning—in Plato. When professionals consider the successor activity that is called ‘philosophy,’ they should therefore wonder about the (...) label. The deposition of she who was once known as Queen of the Sciences is, I argue, really the end of philosophy. Does the prevail¬ing professional attitude attest to mere nostalgia? In fact, the view of philo¬sophy as (say) conceptual enquiry inherits some of the fantasy. To the extent that continued use of the label is internally justified, that signals a deeper mistake on the part of the users about the truth. (shrink)

MacIntyre and the plurality of traditions -- Charles Taylor : strong evaluation and the hermenutics of the modern social imaginary -- Hannah Arendt on reasoning without banisters -- Seyla Benhabib : thinking with Arendt and Habermas against Arendt and Habermas -- Foucault and the art of telling the truth of ourselves -- Connolly and the practice of deep pluralism -- Reasoning through baggage in a global polity.

This dissertation examines the two most popular contemporary revivals of Aristotelian ethics, communitarianism and casuistry. I consider how these two schools of thought which take Aristotle's ethics as their starting point, can seem to be so diametrically opposed. The communitarian approach to ethics, personified by Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel argues that a shared notion of the self or the good life must be sought prior to resolving ethical problems. Conversely, the new casuistic movement, exemplified by the (...) recent work of Albert Jonsen, Stephen Toulmin, and Carson Strong eschews such theoretical baggage in favor of a case-based ethics. By examining each school of thought in the light of their Aristotelian aspirations, namely, their desire to re-establish an ethics based upon prudence that overcomes the fact/value distinction, spurious elements of their rhetoric are rejected. This allows us to see the compatible strains in communitarianism and casuistry and to demonstrate the elements they must borrow from each other in order to be viable approaches to ethical and political philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore and discuss the use of the concept of being affected in biomedical decision making processes in Germany. The corresponding German term ‘Betroffenheit’ characterizes on the one hand a relation between a state of affairs and a person and on the other an emotional reaction that involves feelings like concern and empathy with the suffering of others. An example for the increasing relevance of being affected is the postulation of the participation of people with disabilities and (...) chronic or acute diseases in the discourse, as partly realized in the German National Ethics Council or the Federal Joint Committee. Nevertheless, not only on the political level, the resistance against the participation of affected people is still strong; the academic debate seems to be cross-grained, too. Against this background, we explore the meaning and argumentative role of the concept of being affected as it is used by affected and lay people themselves. Our analysis is based on four focus group discussions in which lay people, patients and relatives of patients discuss their attitudes towards biomedical interventions such as organ transplantation and genetic testing. This setting allows for a comparison of how affected and non-affected people are concerned and deliberate about medical opportunities, but also of how they position themselves as being affected or non-affected with respect to (scientific) knowledge and morality. On this basis, we discuss the normative relevance of being affected for the justification of political participation. (shrink)

In this article we examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value. This line of research is important since firms continue to invest in CSR even though past studies reveal a limited linkage between financial value and CSR. However, the business case for CSR or “doing good while making a profit,” appears to be advancing within the business ethics literature as a preferred conception of CSR. We conjecture that the greater unification and refinement of both profit maximization (...) and stakeholder interests through corporate acts, not statements alone, will sustain the financial value of CSR in a less regulated global business environment. We study the triangle of what companies say, what companies do, and firm financial performance. We analyze Fortune 250 firms and find a positive association between what companies do based on KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. (KLD) ratings, and what companies state about ethics in their CSR statements. We then employ regression analysis and find that companies’ socially responsible acts are positively associated with overall firm value and financial performance. Yet we do not find a statistically significant association between what companies say regarding ethics in their CSR statements and their financial outcomes. These results suggest that firm value and financial performance is associated with what companies do and not what they say. Our results seem to be driven by multinational corporations (MNCs) and not by non‐MNCs. This is possibly because MNCs generally operate in a less regulated global business environment that often necessitates strong ethical corporate leadership to further stakeholder interests. Overall, these results help reconcile corporate and stakeholder objectives since evidence of a link between financial performance and doing good sustains global CSR. (shrink)

Gregor Samsa awakes to find himself transformed into a gigantic bug. The creature’s inchoate flailing leads Gregor’s sister to conclude that Gregor is no more, having been replaced by a brute beast lacking any vestige of human understanding. Sadly, real cases of brain injury and disease can lead to psychological metamorphoses so profound that we cannot easily think that the survivor is the person we knew. I argue that there can be cases in which statements like, “It’s just not Gregor (...) anymore,” are not merely figures of speech. With this in mind, I consider three possible results of saving a biological life: (1) ordinary cases where saving the life will save the person, with strong duties to save the life; (2) cases where the intervention needed to save the life will replace the person, with strong duties not to save the life; (3) cases in which it is indeterminate whether the person will be saved or replaced. How should we think about indeterminate cases? Impersonal ethical considerations miss the point, while standard person-affecting considerations are inapplicable. I suggest turning attention away from survival towards a richer focus on what I call “personal concern.” I show how considerations of personal concern, unlike those of self-interest, need not be tied to survival and how this allows personal concern to provide a basis for ethically substantive discussion of cases where saving a life might result in losing the patient. (shrink)

Moral status arguments are typically formulated as descriptive statements that tell us something about the world. But philosophy of language teaches us that language can also be used performatively: we do things with words and use words to try to get others to do things. Does and should this theory extend to what we say about moral status, and what does it mean? Drawing on Austin, Searle, and Butler and further developing relational views of moral status, this article explores what (...) it means to conceptualize moral status in a performative way and in a way that reaches deep down to its basis, proposes a distinction between strong and weak versions of this view, and discusses the implications for thinking about the moral status of humans and nonhumans. Next to contributing to theory about performativity in the moral domain in general, this effort helps to reveal, understand, and evaluate the performative dimension of utterances made in public discussions about the moral status of animals and artificial agents such as robots and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) (...) plausible. Thoughts are supposed to do work that requires that they be structured and work that requires that they be unstructured. But this cannot be! While the standard response to this problem is to reject either (i) or (ii), I propose a charitable repair in the spirit of Frege’s theory that accepts both. The key idea can be found in Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic(BL, GGA). Frege argues that the thought expressed by a sentence is determined by the truth-conditions that can be derived from the semantic axioms for the sentence constituents. The fact that the same axiomatic truth-condition can be derived in different ways from different semantic axioms suggests a Fregean solution of the dilemma: A thought is a type that is instantiated by all sequences of senses (decomposed thoughts) that have the same axiomatic truth-conditions. This allows for multiple decomposability of the same thought (for different decomposed thoughts can have the same axiomatic truth-conditions) and for a notion of containment (the decomposed thought contains those senses whose semantic axioms are needed in the derivation of the truth-conditions). My proposal combines the virtues of (i) and (ii) without inheriting their vices. (shrink)

This chapter canvasses several arguments for happy‐people‐pills. The argument turns on the idea that happy‐people‐pills will promote such fundamental prudential values as happiness, achievement, and virtue. Since happy‐people‐pills will promote wellbeing, this is a powerful reason to permit their use. In the chapter the case is first made that, far from diminishing autonomy, happy‐people‐pills will enhance autonomy. The chapter argues that happy‐people‐pills will increase the prudential good of individuals. After arguing that at a societal level wellbeing is, for the most (...) part, additive, the chapter goes on to examine an argument that happy‐people‐pills can be multiplicative: their use should encourage the acquisition and exercise of pro‐social virtues. So, not only will happy‐people‐pills benefit those who take them, but they should also promote the good of others. The multiplicative effect is a strong moral reason to suppose that we ought to use happy‐people‐pills. (shrink)

The rise of quantum information theory has lent new relevance to experimental tests for non-classicality, particularly in controversial cases such as adiabatic quantum computing superconducting circuits. The Leggett-Garg inequality is a “Bell inequality in time” designed to indicate whether a single quantum system behaves in a macrorealistic fashion. Unfortunately, a violation of the inequality can only show that the system is either (i) non-macrorealistic or (ii) macrorealistic but subjected to a measurement technique that happens to disturb the system. The “clumsiness” (...) loophole (ii) provides reliable refuge for the stubborn macrorealist, who can invoke it to brand recent experimental and theoretical work on the Leggett-Garg test inconclusive. Here, we present a revised Leggett-Garg protocol that permits one to conclude that a system is either (i) non-macrorealistic or (ii) macrorealistic but with the property that two seemingly non-invasive measurements can somehow collude and strongly disturb the system. By providing an explicit check of the invasiveness of the measurements, the protocol replaces the clumsiness loophole with a significantly smaller “collusion” loophole. (shrink)

There is considerable likelihood that Gottlob Frege began writing his Foundations of Arithmetic with the expectation that he could introduce his numbers, not with sets, but through some algebraic techniques borrowed from earlier writers of the Gottingen school. These rewriting techniques, had they worked, would have required strong philosophical justification provided by Frege's celebrated "context principle," which otherwise serves little evident purpose in the published Foundations.

Electronegativity, described by Linus Pauling described as “The power of an atom in a molecule to attract electrons to itself” (Pauling in The nature of the chemical bond, 3rd edn, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p 88, 1960), is used to predict bond polarity. There are dozens of methods for empirically quantifying electronegativity including: the original thermochemical technique (Pauling in J Am Chem Soc 54:3570–3582, 1932), numerical averaging of the ionisation potential and electron affinity (Mulliken in J Chem Phys 2:782–784, 1934), (...) effective nuclear charge and covalent radius analysis (Sanderson in J Chem Phys 23:2467, 1955) and the averaged successive ionisation energies of an element’s valence electrons (Martynov and Batsanov in Zhurnal Neorganicheskoi Khimii 5:3171–3175, 1980), etc. Indeed, there are such strong correlations between numerous atomic parameters—physical and chemical—that the term “electronegativity” integrates them into a single dimensionless number between 0.78 and 4.00 that can be used to predict/describe/model much of an element’s physical character and chemical behaviour. The design of the common and popular medium form of the periodic table is in large part determined by four quantum numbers and four associated rules. However, adding electronegativity completes the construction so that it displays the multi-parameter periodic law operating in two dimensions, down the groups and across the periods, with minimal ambiguity. (shrink)

The present study examined how emotional fit with culture – the degree of similarity between an individual’ emotional response to the emotional response of others from the same culture – relates to well-being in a sample of Asian American and European American college students. Using a profile correlation method, we calculated three types of emotional fit based on self-reported emotions, facial expressions, and physiological responses. We then examined the relationships between emotional fit and individual well-being (depression, life satisfaction) as well (...) as collective aspects of well-being, namely collective self-esteem (one’s evaluation of one’s cultural group) and identification with one’s group. The results revealed that self-report emotional fit was associated with greater individual well-being across cultures. In contrast, culture moderated the relationship between self-report emotional fit and collective self-esteem, such that emotional fit predicted greater collective self-esteem in Asian Americans, but not in European Americans. Behavioral emotional fit was unrelated to well-being. There was a marginally significant cultural moderation in the relationship between physiological emotional fit in a strong emotional situation and group identification. Specifically, physiological emotional fit predicted greater group identification in Asian Americans, but not in European Americans. However, this finding disappeared after a Bonferroni correction. The current finding extends previous research by showing that, while emotional fit may be closely related to individual aspects of well-being across cultures, the influence of emotional fit on collective aspects of well-being may be unique to cultures that emphasize interdependence and social harmony, and thus being in alignment with other members of the group. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Geach's problem, the problem of accounting for the fact that judgements expressed using moral terms function logically like other judgements, stands in the way of most noncognitive analyses of moral judgements. The non-cognitivist must offer a plausible interpretation of such terms when they appear in conditionals that also explains their logical interaction with straightforward moral assertions. Blackburn and Gibbard have offered a series of accounts each of which interprets such conditionals as expressing higher order commitments. Each then invokes norms for (...) the coherent acceptance of attitudes to explain why we hold certain combinations inconsistent. Against these accounts the paper presses two related objections: (1) The norms needed to do the explanatory work cannot be strong enough to do that work without also ruling clearly consistent attitudes inconsistent. And (2), the norms of rational attitude acceptance do not neatly track the distinction between consistent and inconsistent attitudes. (shrink)

Errors and episodes of “freezing” seen during mirror writing by adults can be incorporated into the model suggested in Thelen et al.'s target article This requires assigning an important role to internal inverse models stored in memory. The strongly anti-dualism position of Thelen et al.'s leaves little room for the Bernsteinian notion of activity.

By using religion to get at the core concepts of Michel Foucault's thinking, this book offers a strong alternative to the way that the philosopher's work is read across the humanities. Foucault was famously interested in Christianity as both the rival to ancient ethics and the parent of modern discipline and was always alert to the hypocrisy and the violence in churches. Yet many readers have ignored how central religion is to his thought, particularly with regard to human bodies (...) and how they are shaped. The point is not to turn Foucault into some sort of believer or to extract from him a fixed thesis about religion as such. Rather, it is to see how Foucault engages religious _rhetoric_ page after page—even when religion is not his main topic. When readers follow his allusions, they can see why he finds in religion not only an object of critique, but a perennial provocation to think about how speech works on bodies—and how bodies resist. Arguing that Foucault conducts experiments in writing to frustrate academic expectations about history and theory, Mark Jordan gives equal weight to the performative and theatrical aspects of Foucault's writing or lecturing. How does Foucault stage possibilities of self-transformation? How are his books or lectures akin to the rituals and liturgies that he dissects in them? _Convulsing Bodies_ follows its own game of hide-and-seek with the agents of totalizing systems and gives us a Foucault who plays with his audiences as he plays for them—or teaches them. (shrink)

Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of (...) properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers. (shrink)

Human societies are examined as distinct and coherent groups. This trait is most parsimoniously considered a deeply rooted part of our ancestry rather than a recent cultural invention. Our species is the only vertebrate with society memberships of significantly more than 200. We accomplish this by using society-specific labels to identify members, in what I call an anonymous society. I propose that the human brain has evolved to permit not only the close relationships described by the social brain hypothesis, but (...) also, at little mental cost, the anonymous societies within which such alliances are built. The human compulsion to discover or invent labels to “mark” group memberships may originally have been expressed in hominins as vocally learned greetings only slightly different in function from chimpanzee pant hoots (now known to be society-specific). The weight of evidence suggests that at some point, conceivably early in the hominin line, the distinct groups composed of several bands that were typical of our ancestors came to be distinguished by their members on the basis of multiple labels that were socially acquired in this way, the earliest of which would leave no trace in the archaeological record. Often overlooked as research subjects, these sizable fission-fusion communities, in recent egalitarian hunter-gatherers sometimes 2,000 strong, should consistently be accorded the status of societies, in the same sense that this word is used to describe tribes, chiefdoms, and other cultures arising later in our history. The capacity of hunter-gatherer societies to grow sufficiently populous that not all members necessarily recognize one another would make the transition to larger agricultural societies straightforward. Humans differ from chimpanzees in that societal labels are essential to the maintenance of societies and the processes giving birth to new ones. I propose that anonymous societies of all kinds can expand only so far as their labels can remain sufficiently stable. (shrink)

The theatrical device of the bed-trick occurs fifty-two times in forty-four plays during the English Renaissance.1 Just as in the first two plays employing it, Alphonsus, Emperor of Germany and Grim the Collier of Croyden, male characters arrange 60 percent of the bed-tricks used in gaining control over women. Shakespeare's heroines in All's Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure, then, appear to mark a decisive break from the bed-trick's evolutionary pattern. Helen and Mariana, respectively, persevere in their (...) endeavors in spite of a male-dominant hierarchy. Yet, upon closer inspection, men are the ones who create the circumstances that prompt the necessity of using the device. They impose such... (shrink)

Nietzsche is undoubtedly one of the most original and influential thinkers in the history of philosophy. With ideas such as the overman, will to power, the eternal recurrence, and perspectivism, Nietzsche challenges us to reconceive how it is that we know and understand the world, and what it means to be a human being. Further, in his works, he not only grapples with previous great philosophers and their ideas, but he also calls into question and redefines what it means to (...) do philosophy. Nietzsche and the Philosophers for the first time sets out to examine explicitly Nietzsche’s relationship to his most important predecessors. This anthology includes essays by many of the leading Nietzsche scholars, including Keith Ansell-Pearson, Daniel Conway, Tracy B. Strong, Gary Shapiro, Babette Babich, Mark Anderson, and Paul S. Loeb. These excellent writers discuss Nietzsche’s engagement with such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Socrates, Hume, Schopenhauer, Emerson, Rousseau, and the Buddha. Anyone interested in Nietzsche or the history of philosophy generally will find much of great interest in this volume. (shrink)

I argue that emotions are belief/desire sets characterized by strong desire.

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least (...) from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger. (shrink)

In this astonishingly rich volume, experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship on what is arguably Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. A lengthy introduction, annotated (...) bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research. (shrink)

Psychological Altruism (PA) is the view that everyone, ultimately, acts altruistically all the time. I defend PA by showing strong prima facie support, and show how a reinterpretive strategy against supposed counterexamples is successful. I go on to show how PA can be argued for in ways which exactly mirror the arguments for an opposing view, Psychological Egoism. This shows that the case for PA is at least as plausible as PE. Since the case for PA is not plausible, (...) neither is that for PE. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Subjective Knowledge, Mental Disorders, and MedsHow to Parse the EquationMark D. Rego (bio)Keywordspsychopathology, antidepressants, suicidality, subjective experience, pre-reflectiveA few weeks, ago I was walking down the hall to my office when I spotted my brother-in-law coming the other way. This was odd on two accounts. First, he lives in Kentucky (I am in Connecticut) and second, he is at least a foot taller than the man in my hallway. (...) Nonetheless, I struggled to figure out why he was there. The resemblance was so striking it took me a minute or two to convince myself it was not him. Even after such convincing, the feeling that it was him remained.Later, I imagined that had I just returned from a crack cocaine den I would have been hypervigilant, if not paranoid, and consequently would be certain that my brother-in-law had arrived unannounced. Furthermore, I would probably assume that he was up to no good.How did I retain a strong feeling of recognition, the feeling that maybe it was really him, when I already concluded otherwise? And why, were I on crack cocaine, would the obvious facts be useless in rendering a decision about the identity of the man in the hall? Last, why would the post-cocaine man in the hall become a nefarious brother-in-law rather than a benign one?If I just computed some symbols to figure this out, wouldn't the feeling have gone away? If I activated a brother-in-law neural network, how did I come to acquire an evil brother-in-law neural network? And why wouldn't that go away either?In his article in this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Hadreas looks at questions like these through the prism of before and after effects of people treated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Hadreas investigates the implications of a straightforward recomputation of self-awareness when treated with these medicines and finds such approaches unsatisfying and incomplete in their explanatory power. (My example looks at a type of awareness, but not specifically self-awareness, as does Hadreas. Furthermore, my paradigm asks about computational conclusions using language more common in psychiatric literature, whereas Hadreas uses standard philosophical terms. Although not isomorphic, I believe the interchange of the two remains true to the issues Hadreas is addressing). [End Page 57]In my example, there is clearly something else going on than the incorrect arrangement of symbols or the misfiring of nodes in a network that influences how I feel and what I think. Neither reason nor empiricism seem to serve me well here. Hadreas utilizes Husserl to begin to unpeel the layers of self-awareness and self-states that intermix to form the shifts and contradictions which are so common in psychiatric treatment (and in common experience as I describe).This is a welcome reckoning; the psychiatric literature is overflowing with unquestioned premises about the neuropsychiatric correlates of reason and empirical approaches (described more as computation and neural networks in the literature—again, not strictly analogous, but the same criticisms apply) Hadreas is critical of. Unfortunately, Hadreas has navigated through a sea of highly questionable assumptions about the psychopharmacology of depression to illustrate his points. This is due in large part to the common practice of consulting literary narratives and critics rather than one of immersion in the literature as a whole and the daily life of patients and active clinicians. He arrived at his destination despite this, because many of these details did not affect his particular analysis. However, to look forward to a continuation of this work and clarify some important issues I devote most of my commentary to these issues. The points I raise are more extensively discussed in a previous edition of this journal (Rego 2005).Affect to Reason ShiftLet's begin with the idea that SSRIs work by dampening emotions. An extension of this idea is that they dampen negative emotions and strengthen positive ones like assertiveness, confidence, and optimism. An even further development in this direction is that, by dampening strong emotions, cognitive enhancement takes place with SSRI treatment. A summary observation then is that SSRIs facilitate... (shrink)

Studies of how scientists select research problems suggest the process involves weighing a number of factors, including funding availability, likelihood of success versus failure, and perceived publishability of likely results, among others. In some fields, a strong personal interest in conducting science to bring about particular social and environmental outcomes plays an important role. Conservation biologists are frequently motivated by a desire that their research will contribute to improved conservation outcomes, which introduces a pair of challenging questions for managers (...) of science and scholars of policies governing science: 1) How do scientists integrate that goal into their processes of research priority evaluation, and 2) How can managers and funders of science utilize that knowledge in designing and administering funding programs? I use Q method to uncover four distinct schools of thought amongst researchers and knowledge-users about the merits of possible research priorities for coral reefs; one of the axes along which these schools of thought differ is in their interpretation of how science can and should interact with policy. The results reveal that perceived severity of reef stressors plays a role for some participants. Disciplinary training does not appear to be a major influence on research priority evaluation, but individual participants indicated professional expediency does prevent some researchers from pursuing or advocating that others pursue topics outside of that disciplinary specialty. Influences on and processes in research prioritization uncovered in this study have the potential to lead to counter-productive disciplinary path dependencies. From these results and building on outside literature, I conclude that better coordination and communication about research priorities across disciplines and with broader stakeholders – including knowledge users – could improve the research enterprise’s ability to contribute to meaningful societal and conservation goals. These findings are relevant to researchers and research administrators across disciplines that seek to conduct or fund science that is useful in addressing specific goals. (shrink)

Standard semantic information processing models—information in; information processed; information out —lend themselves to standard models of the functioning of the brain in terms, e.g., of threshold-switch neurons connected via classical synapses. That is, in terms of sophisticated descendants of McCulloch and Pitts models. I argue that both the cognition and the brain sides of this framework are incorrect: cognition and thought are not constituted as forms of semantic information processing, and the brain does not function in terms of passive input (...) processing units organized as neural nets. An alternative framework is developed that models cognition and thought not in terms of semantic information processing, and, correspondingly, models brain functional processes also not in terms of semantic information processing. As alternative to such models: I outline a pragmatist oriented, interaction based, model of representation; derive from this model a fundamental framework of constraints on how the brain must function; show that such a framework is in fact found in the brain, and develop the outlines of a broader model of how mental processes can be realized within this alternative framework. Part I of this discussion focuses on some criticisms of standard modeling frameworks for representation and cognition, and outlines an alternative interactivist, pragmatist oriented, model. In part II, the focus is on the fact that the brain does not, in fact, function in accordance with standard passive input processing models—e.g., information processing models. Instead, there are multiple endogenously active processes at multiple spatial and temporal scales across multiple kinds of cells. A micro-functional model that accounts for, and even predicts, these multi-scale phenomena in generating emergent representation and cognition is outlined. That is, I argue that the interactivist model of representation outlined offers constraints on how the brain should function that are in fact empirically found, and, in reverse, that the multifarious details of brain functioning entail the pragmatist representational model—a very strong interrelationship. In the sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented here: sometimes called the predictive brain approach. (shrink)

An imaginary desert island scenario provides the setting for a story which is designed to expose the shortcomings of deterrence, reform and restitution theories of punishment, and to emphasize the intuitive appeal of Kant's strong retributivist insistence that there is a positive obligation to punish offenders just qua offenders, and not merely an automatic right to do so (weak retributivism). Nevertheless, it is urged that though the fact that an offence has been committed can in itself suffice to establish (...) that punishment is in some sense required, this requirement at most supports a position that is intermediate between Kantian retributivism and weak retributivism. (shrink)

I offer an appreciation and critique of Ernst Fehr’s altruism research in experimental economics that challenges the "selfishness axiom" as an account of human behavior. I describe examples of Fehr’s experiments and their results and consider his conceptual terminology, particularly his "biological" definition of altruism and its counterintuitive implications. I also look at Fehr’s experiments from a methodological perspective and examine his explanations of subjects’ behavior. In closing, I look at Fehr’s neuroscientific work in experimental economics and question his adherence (...) to a subjective expected utility interpretation of subjects’ behavior. Key Words: altruism • Ernst Fehr • strong reciprocity • neuroeconomics • experimental economics. (shrink)